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HEALTH LAW-PROVIDER CHALLENGE TO STATE MEDICAID
REIMBURSEMENT PLAN
Temple University v. White (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Congress responded to the growing demand for govern-
mental assistance in the area of health care financing by enacting the
Medicare' and Medicaid 2 programs. Medicare was created as a "nation-
wide health insurance program for people aged sixty-five and over,
[and] for certain disabled persons," 3 while Medicaid was created "for
the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that
choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy per-
sons." Jointly funded by the federal and state governments, the Medi-
caid program provides health care coverage to the indigent and
medically needy.5
1. Title XVIII of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988)).
2. Title XIX of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97,
79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988)).
3. ROBERT J. BUCHANAN & JAMES D. MINOR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH
CARE REIMBURSEMENT 17 (1985). Medicare is a federal health insurance pro-
gram available to qualified beneficiaries regardless of income. Id. The program
is funded through payroll taxes and premiums and is uniformly administered
throughout the United States. Id.
4. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). One commentator has
noted:
Though adopted together, Medicare and Medicaid reflected
sharply different traditions. Medicare was buoyed by [the] popular ap-
proval and acknowledged dignity of Social Security; Medicaid was bur-
dened by the stigma of public assistance. While Medicare had uniform
national standards for eligibility and benefits, Medicaid left the states to
decide how extensive their programs would be. Medicare allowed phy-
sicians to charge above what the program would pay; Medicaid did not
and participation among physicians was far more limited. The objec-
tive of Medicaid was to allow the poor to buy into the "mainstream" of
medicine, but neither the federal government nor the states were will-
ing to spend the money that would have been required.
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 370 (1982).
5. See Deborah M. Naglak, Medicare/Medicaid Reimbursement Issues-A Pro-
vider's Perspective, 34 Soc. SEC. REP. SERV. 3, 4 (1991). Participation in the Medi-
caid program is optional, but once a state elects to participate, it must comply
with all federal requirements. Harris, 448 U.S. at 301. Reimbursement under
Medicaid encompasses payment for health care services provided to both the
indigent and medically needy. Id. at 301 n.1. The covered services include inpa-
tient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, laboratory and X-ray serv-
ices, skilled nursing facility care, pediatric screening and diagnosis, family
planning services and physician care. Id. at 301-02.
Eligibility for Medicaid is different than that for Medicare because Medicaid
(1081)
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Under the original Medicaid programs, providers of inpatient
health care services 6 to Medicaid patients received reimbursement that
was calculated retrospectively based on the actual costs incurred in
treating those patients. 7 Prior to 1972, such "actual costs" were reim-
bursed based on federally developed "reasonable cost" reimbursement
principles.8 Beginning in 1972, Congress permitted states "to develop
is a welfare program. STARR, supra note 4, at 370. Medicaid eligibility is primar-
ily based on economic need; each Medicaid recipient "must show that his or her
income and resources fall below certain levels set by the states pursuant to
broad federal guidelines." BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 232 (2d ed. 1991).
Medicaid recipients fall within two broad categories. The first group of
Medicaid recipients is the "categorically needy," which includes those persons
whose below-poverty-level income qualifies them for Medicaid benefits. Id. at
232-33. The "categorically needy" are sometimes referred to as the "deserving
poor." Id. at 232. The second group of Medicaid recipients is the "medically
needy," which includes those persons whose income is above the financial eligi-
bility standards but who incur substantial medical expenses that when taken into
consideration, drop the recipient's income level below federal standards. Id. at
233. For a general discussion of the Medicaid program, see BUCHANAN & MI-
NOR, supra note 3, at 137-45.
6. Medicaid programs reimburse both inpatient and outpatient health care
providers, including hospitals and private physicians, for delivering care to
Medicaid recipients. BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 3, at 137-38.
In Temple University v. White, 941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 873 (1992), only inpatient acute-care hospitals challenged the Medicaid
reimbursement rate. Therefore, all references in this Casebrief to "health care
providers" refer only to the Medicaid reimbursement process as it relates to
inpatient acute-care hospitals.
7. See Karl A. Thallner, Jr., Prospective Payment System: Preclusion of Review of
Hospital Base Year Cost Calculations, 6J. LEGAL MED. 509, 511-12 (1985). The "ac-
tual" hospital charges were subject to a "reasonableness" standard. Id. at 511-
12 & n.29. Essentially, this standard permitted the government to deduct from
such actual costs those costs that were "unnecessary for the efficient delivery of
needed health services." Id. at 512 n.29 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(y)(1)(A)
(1982)); see also Naglak, supra note 5, at 3-4.
Understanding the fine distinctions between "actual costs" and "reasonable
costs" can be facilitated by knowing which hospital costs are reimbursable under
Medicare and Medicaid. The federal and state programs reimburse hospitals
not only for the costs directly associated with the care of a qualified recipient,
but also for a percentage of general expenses, such as overhead, capital costs
and direct medical education costs. See BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 3, at 35-
43. Therefore, when hospitals submitted actual costs, including these general
expenses, for reimbursement and the costs were not considered "unreasonable"
(unnecessary for efficient delivery of care), full reimbursement was received.
Thallner, supra, at 511-12 & n.29.
8. See BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 3, at 147. The original Medicaid stat-
ute used the "reasonable cost" terminology and provided for retrospective "rea-
sonable cost" reimbursement. Id. at 147-48. The Medicaid statute
requirements permitted the states to reimburse inpatient hospitals using the
rates set by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) for Medicare reimbursement. Id. The Medicare rates were established
by the Medicare Act based on guidelines such as historical costs and current
average costs. See generally Naglak, supra note 5, at 4-5 & n.10. The statutes,
however, were perceived as investing too much control in a federal agency. Wil-
2
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their own reasonable cost payment system for hospital care." 9 The
state-developed reimbursement structures, however, could not establish
Medicaid reimbursement rates that exceeded either the hospital's cus-
tomary charges or the federally imposed caps.' 0 In addition, both the
federally determined and the state-determined reimbursement plans
continued to utilize retrospective reimbursement." Accordingly, the
rates were based on the actual hospital costs resulting from the treat-
ment of Medicaid recipients, qualified by "reasonable cost" reimburse-
ment principles. 12
The escalation of health care costs and the increasing percentage of
federal funds spent on Medicare/Medicaid programs prompted Con-
gress to enact a variety of reforms.' 3 In 1980, Congress enacted the
Boren Amendment which "repealed the 'reasonable cost' standard of
reimbursement existing under the prior law, replacing it with a standard
which required reimbursement at rates that [were] 'reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and eco-
nomically operated facilities.' "14 Under the Boren Amendment, the
der v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 505 (1990). The original Medicaid
reimbursement process was also criticized as contributing to the rapid rise in
health care costs in the United States because it failed to include incentives that
encouraged providers to minimize costs. Thallner, supra note 7, at 512.
9. BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 3, at 147.
10. Id. at 149. For the current federal regulations specifying these require-
ments, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.253(b)(1), 447.271(a) (1992).
11. Thallner, supra note 7, at 511-12.
12. Id.; see generally C. Lee Cusenbary, Jr., Note, Civil Rights-Medicaid Act-
Under the Boren Amendment, Health Care Providers Have an Enforceable Right, Actionable
Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, to Challenge a State's Reimbursement Plan Under the Medicaid
Act, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 519, 525-26 (1990). For a discussion of the "actual
cost"/"reasonable cost" issue, see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
13. See Thallner, supra note 7, at 512-15. Prior to these reforms, the major-
ity of Medicaid reimbursement plans were based on retrospective cost-based re-
imbursement. BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 3, at 147-48. The legislative
history reveals that as part of the reforms, Congress wanted to encourage states
to switch to a prospective payment system. H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 293 (1981). Generally, a prospective payment system utilizes reimburse-
ment rates that are predetermined based on diagnosis and treatment factors.
Thallner, supra note 7, at 515-16. As part of the health care reform package, the
federal government developed a prospective payment system for Medicare reim-
bursement. Id. at 514-15. State Medicaid reimbursement plans, on the other
hand, were not required to use the federal prospective payment system-each
state could develop its own system of payment. BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note
3, at 148-52. The states, however, did revise existing Medicaid reimbursement
plans; by 1984, thirty-three states adopted "prospective rate-setting system[s]."
Id. at 152. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's prospective payment system, see
infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
14. Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1309 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (1988)). The Boren Amendment recites
that a state will provide
for payment . . .of the hospital services . . .provided under the plan
through the use of rates (determined in accordance with methods and
standards developed by the State ... and which, in the case of hospi-
3
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states were charged with the responsibility for and control of Medicaid
reimbursement rate setting.' 5
Although the states are responsible for the development of Medi-
tals, take into account the situation of hospitals which serve a dispro-
portionate number of low income patients with special needs . . . )
which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secre-
tary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be in-
curred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to
provide care and services in conformity with applicable State and Fed-
eral laws ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (1988); see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (original enactment of Boren
Amendment).
The change in terminology from "reasonable costs" to "costs reasonable
and adequate" reflected Congress' desire to advance two aims: 1) the transfer
of control over reimbursement plan development from the federal level to the
state level; and 2) the encouragement of states to develop individualized Medi-
caid programs while continuing to provide "reasonable and adequate" reim-
bursement. Cusenbary, Note, supra note 12, at 525, 528-29. The purposes of
the Boren Amendment were: "(1) to provide the states with greater flexibility
in developing methods of reimbursing skilled nursing facilities, intermediate
care facilities, and inpatient hospital services; and (2) to increase the economy
and efficiency of all plans." Pinnacle Nursing Home, 928 F.2d at 1309-10 (citing S.
REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
396, 744). Nonetheless, "[tlhe flexibility given the States [was] not intended to
encourage arbitrary reductions in payment that would adversely affect the qual-
ity of care." Id. at 1310 (quoting S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 478
(1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 744).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A). The Boren Amendment transferred the
primary responsibility for the development of reimbursement rates from HHS to
the state Medicaid agencies. Cusenbary, Note, supra note 12, at 526. The trans-
fer of control from the federal to the state level occurred because Congress asso-
ciated rising Medicaid costs with the complex and rigid federal regulations. See
H.R. REP. No. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 292-93 (1981); S. REP. No. 471, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11-15, 28-29 (1979). Congress envisioned the Boren Amend-
ment as providing greater latitude to the states to develop alternative reimburse-
ment plans, while continuing to provide reasonable rates to health care
providers. The amendment's legislative history states:
The [Boren Amendment] provides States with additional flexibility
in determining the payment rate for inpatient hospital services. The
bill deletes the current provision requiring States to reimburse hospi-
tals on a reasonable cost basis. It substitutes a provision requiring
States to reimburse hospitals at rates (determined in accordance with
methods and standards developed by the States) that are reasonable
and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently
and economically operated facilities in order to meet applicable laws
and quality and safety standards. The section further requires States to
provide assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, for the filing of uni-
form cost reports by each hospital and periodic audits by the State of
such reports. . ..
The committee continues to believe that States should have flexi-
bility in developing methods of payment for their medicaid programs
and that application of the reasonable cost reimbursement principles of
the medicare program for hospital services is not entirely satisfactory.
These principles are inherently inflationary and contain no incentives
for efficient performance .... The flexibility given the States is not
1084 [Vol. 37: p. 1081
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caid reimbursement plans, the Boren Amendment contains both proce-
dural and substantive requirements that each state's Medicaid
reimbursement plan must meet.' 6 To satisfy the Boren Amendment's
procedural requirements, each Medicaid-participating state must follow
specified procedures annually, or whenever a new state Medicaid plan is
implemented. 17 First, the state must perform a "findings" process,
based on proper methods and standards, to obtain adequate informa-
tion to support the reimbursement payment structure in the state
plan. 18 Second, the state must provide assurances to the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) that all federal requirements have
been met.' 9 The three substantive requirements of the Boren Amend-
ment are:
(1) [That state's] rates take into account the circumstances of
hospitals serving a disproportionate share of low-income pa-
tients; (2) [that] its "rates are reasonable and adequate to meet
the necessary costs of an efficiently operated hospital;" and
(3) [that] its rates are reasonable and adequate "to assure
intended to encourage arbitrary reductions in payment that would ad-
versely affect the quality of care.
S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
396, 744; see also H.R. REP. No. 158, supra, at 293.
In Pennsylvania, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) is responsible for
the state Medicaid plan. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 205 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992). DPW developed a Medical Assistance
Program (MAP) that sets forth Pennsylvania's Medicaid reimbursement payment
system. Id.
16. Pinnacle Nursing Home, 928 F.2d at 1313, 1316-17.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A).
18. Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789,
796 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990).
19. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (Boren Amendment) (requiring
"assurances" satisfactory to Secretary). For the specific language of the Boren
Amendment, see supra note 14. For the statutory and regulatory langauge that
sets forth these requirements, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.252(b) (agency must "spec-
ify comprehensively the methods and standards used by the agency to set pay-
ment rates"); 447.253(b)(1) (payment of rates state finds are "reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically
operated facilities"); 447.253(a) (agency must provide assurances to Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) that standards have been met) (1992).
The procedural requirements mandate that a state "submit to the Secretary
[of HHS] assurances, based on findings made by the state, that its Medicaid plan
complies with federal requirements for such plans." Pinnacle Nursing Home, 928
F.2d at 1313. These findings are vital to provide a basis for the conclusions used
by the state in revising a Medicaid reimbursement plan. Id. In conjunction with
these findings, a state is required to make assurances to the Secretary of HHS
regarding the validity of the state's Medicaid reimbursement plan. Amisub, 879
F.2d at 796-97. The Amisub court commented that "[m]ere recitation of the
wording of the federal statute is not sufficient for procedural compliance. There
is a presumption that a state will engage in a bona fide finding process before it
makes assurances to HCFA that the required findings have been made." Id. at
797.
5
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medicaid patients of reasonable access to inpatient hospital
care."
20
Since the enactment of the Boren Amendment, a significant amount
of litigation has resulted from health care provider allegations of im-
proper reimbursement planning by state agencies. 2 1 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in Temple University v.
20. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 22 (3d Cir. 1989)), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 873 (1992).
21. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding that Pennsylvania Medicaid reimbursement plan substantively vi-
olated Boren Amendment in plan's application to out-of-state hospitals), aff'd,
111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991); Amisub, 879 F.2d 789 (holding that Medicaid payment
rates were arbitrary and capricious and did not meet procedural and substantive
federal requirements); Multicare Medical Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (requiring that state identify and determine economically
and efficiently operated hospital facilities to meet "findings" requirement);
Michigan Hosp. Ass'n v. Babcock, 736 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (conclud-
ing that state failed to make proper findings prior to providing assurances to
HCFA regarding Medicaid reimbursement plan).
Suits by health care providers had also been commonplace in federal courts
prior to the enactment of the Boren Amendment. For examples of pre-Boren
Amendment suits, see Cusenbary, Note, supra note 12, at 527 & n.35.
As enacted in 1980, the Boren Amendment initially applied to nursing
homes and long-term and intermediate care facilities. Naglak, supra note 5, at 6.
Medicaid reimbursement is important to the financial solvency of many nursing
homes because "[t]he Medicaid program has become the largest government
purchaser of long-term care in the United States." BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra
note 3, at 185. For example, "[t]he Medicaid program pays for approximately
67% of all nursing home patient days in Washington State. This percentage is
comparable to, although slightly higher than, that seen in other states ....
Thus, the Medicaid program is the principal payer for nursing home care in the
United States." Folden v. Washington State Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 744
F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (W.D. Wash. 1990). For examples of litigation by nursing
home owners alleging Boren Amendment violations, see the following cases:
Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
state findings did not establish nexus between cost of operating efficient and
economic nursing home and reimbursement rates provided); Nebraska Health
Care Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
budgetary restrictions on rate increases without presence of adequate findings
was procedural violation of Boren Amendment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063
(1987); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Bradley, 776 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. 11. 1991)
(stating that failure to make findings and failure to establish reasonable reim-
bursement rates were procedural and substantive violations of Boren Amend-
ment); Lapeer County Medical Care Facility v. Michigan, 765 F. Supp. 1291
(W.D. Mich. 1991) (concluding that arbitrary 30% budget reduction of nursing
home reimbursement rates without proper findings was violation of Boren
Amendment); and Independent Nursing Home v. Simmons, 732 F. Supp. 684
(S.D. Miss. 1990) (holding that inadequate notice of state plan revision was pro-
cedural violation of Boren Amendment requirements). For a discussion of suits
brought following the 1981 expansion of the Boren Amendment to hospitals,
see infra notes 55, 64 & 68-76 and accompanying text. For a general discussion
of Medicaid and long-term care reimbursement, see BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra
note 3, at 185-235.
1086
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White2 2 is representative of such litigation and reveals the extent to
which federal courts are willing to protect the financial stability of the
hospitals that deliver medical care to Medicaid recipients. In Temple Uni-
versity, a number of Pennsylvania hospitals brought suit against the De-
partment of Public Welfare (DPW), the state agency charged with
administrative control of the Pennsylvania Medicaid plan.2 3 The plain-
tiffs alleged that the reimbursement plan developed by DPW to pay hos-
pitals for inpatient treatment of Medicaid recipients was inadequate
under the Boren Amendment's procedural and substantive require-
ments. 24 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the Pennsylvania Medicaid plan violated the pro-
cedural and substantive requirements of the Boren Amendment. 25 The
district court ordered the state to revise the Medicaid plan and provided
interim injunctive relief to the affected hospitals during the revision pe-
riod.2 6 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit agreed with the district court that the DPW plan violated the
Boren Amendment requirements and upheld the remedy tailored by the
district court to correct the Medicaid reimbursement plan
inadequacies. 27
II. CASE ANALYSIS
A. Facts
In Temple University, over 140 Pennsylvania hospitals challenged the
Pennsylvania Medical Assistance Program (MAP)-the reimbursement
payment structure established by the Pennsylvania DPW pursuant to
federal Medicaid requirements. 28 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
the 1988-1989 DPW reimbursement plan failed to meet the require-
ments of the Boren Amendment. 29 The attack on the MAP plan was
twofold. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the MAP plan did not comply
22. 941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992).
23. Id. at 205.
24. Id. For a discussion of the Boren Amendment requirements, see supra
notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
25. Temple Univ. v. White, 729 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd,
941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992).
26. Id. at 1100-01. For a discussion of the district court findings and the
remedy granted, see infra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
27. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 220.
28. Id. at 205; see Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396s (1988). The hospitals challenged the validity of the payment rates estab-
lished by DPW to reimburse hospitals that provided inpatient health care serv-
ices to Medicaid recipients. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 205. The suit was
brought against DPW, the agency responsible for the development and imple-
mentation of the Medicaid reimbursement plan. Id.
29. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 205. The Boren Amendment shifted re-
sponsibility and control of state reimbursement plans from the Secretary of
HHS to the states. Cusenbary, Note, supra note 12, at 526.
19921 1087
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with the procedural requirements of the Boren Amendment because
"findings" were not made as to whether the methods and standards of
the MAP plan were proper.30 Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the
MAP plan did not comply with the substantive requirements Of the Bo-
ren Amendment because: 1) the MAP payment rates were unreasona-
ble and inadequate; and 2) the MAP plan did not adequately address
the payment structure for hospitals providing care to a disproportionate
share of low-income patients. 3 '
In order to understand the factual allegations in and holding of the
Temple University decision, a brief discussion of the Pennsylvania Medi-
caid reimbursement plan is necessary. A review of the history of Medi-
caid reimbursement in Pennsylvania reveals that prior to June 30, 1984,
the MAP plan provided that hospitals be retrospectively reimbursed
based on the actual costs expended in providing care to Medicaid pa-
tients.3 2 In response to the passage of the Boren Amendment, DPW
revised the MAP plan and changed the method of reimbursement to a
prospective payment system.3 3 Under the prospective payment system,
"the operating costs of most acute care inpatient hospital stays are reim-
bursed by a flat payment per discharge that is a multiple of the hospital's
'payment rate' and a 'relative value' assigned to the diagnostic related
30. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 205. The Boren Amendment requires
states to "find" and make assurances to the Secretary of HHS that the state re-
imbursement plans are based on proper methods and standards. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396(a)(13)(A). For the text of the Boren Amendment, see supra note 14.
When interpreting this language, courts have declined to read this procedural
requirement as "mere surplusage." See Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928
F.2d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of suits in other jurisdictions
where the courts agree with the characterization of meaningful findings as a pro-
cedural requirement of the Boren Amendment, see infra notes 60-64 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the congressional intent behind the language
of the Boren Amendment, see supra notes 14-15. For a discussion of the proce-
dural requirements of the Boren Amendment, see supra notes 17-19 and accom-
panying text.
31. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 205. For a discussion of the substantive
requirements of the Boren Amendment, see supra note 20 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of a prior Third Circuit case that analyzed allegations of
substantive violations of the Boren Amendment, see infra notes 69-76 and ac-
companying text.
32. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 208. Pennsylvania's MAP plan had been
based on a retrospectively calculated actual cost reimbursement process that
mirrored the standard method of federal reimbursement under Medi-
care/Medicaid. See generally Thallner, supra note 7, at 511-12; Cusenbary, Note,
supra note 12, at 525-26. For a discussion of the retrospective and prospective
reimbursement rates issues, see supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
33. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 208. Most prospective payment systems,
including Pennsylvania's system, reimburse at a flat fee which is determined in
advance based in part on factors such as the medical diagnosis, treatment and
resource use of the patient. Thallner, supra note 7, at 515-16. For such calcula-
tions, each patient discharge is classified into a diagnostic related group (DRG).
Temple University, 941 F.2d at 208. For a discussion of the congressional intent to
encourage states to develop prospective payment systems, see supra note 13.
1088 [Vol. 37: p. 1081
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group ('DRG') into which the particular case falls."'3 4 In order to deter-
mine the "relative value" portion of the reimbursement rate, DPW iden-
tified 477 categories of DRGs based on a variety of medical diagnoses
and calculated a flat reimbursement rate for each DRG. 3 5 In order to
determine the "payment rate" portion, DPW then classified Penn-
sylvania hospitals into groups "in an effort to treat similarly situated in-
stitutions in similar fashion."' 36 Within each group, the reimbursement
34. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 208. Each hospital's reimbursement was
affected by two major factors: 1) the relative value assigned to each patient's
diagnosis on discharge, and 2) the hospital's payment rate. Id.
A DRG consists of medical diagnoses that are " 'clinically coherent and ho-
mogenous with respect to resource use,' and, therefore, a sum of money is as-
signed to each DRG to reflect the cost of treatment based on data from previous
years." Thallner, supra note 7, at 515-16 (footnote omitted). The provider re-
ceives this flat fee regardless of how much is spent on the specific patient. Id. at
516. The objective is to encourage providers to maximize the efficient utiliza-
tion of health care resources and lower the need for federal financing. Id. For
example, if a patient is admitted and diagnosed as having coronary artery dis-
ease, the DRG would be calculated based on this primary disease, the type of
treatment provided (surgical or medical) and the presence of any other secon-
dary diagnoses or health problems (such as diabetes, asthma and/or age). One
of the 477 DRG categories includes a pre-established payment rate for a patient
who has coronary artery disease and a secondary diagnosis, and who is undergo-
ing surgical treatment. Therefore, the hospital would receive, as the relative
value portion of the reimbursement, the prospectively determined payment
amount for this DRG. See generally BUCHANAN & MINOR, supra note 3, at 31-36;
FURROW, supra note 5, at 392-94.
35. Temple Univ. v. White, 729 F. Supp. 1093, 1096-97 (E.D. Pa. 1990),
aff'd, 941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992). Under the
Pennsylvania MAP plan, DPW calculated the relative value of each DRG by tak-
ing the historical costs of each diagnosis and dividing it by the number of cases
of that diagnosis among Medicaid patients. Id. at 1097. The standardized cost
for each DRG was then divided by the average costs of all DRGs to determine
the relative value of each DRG. Id. The most expensive DRGs were then ex-
cluded. Id. "Thus," as the district court noted, "historical costs for similar
kinds of hospital admissions are the starting point for calculating reimburse-
ments under the plan." Id.
36. Id. at 1097. Four broad categories of cost-factors-teaching, medical
assistance volume, environment and cost grouping-with a total of thirteen vari-
ables were used to define pertinent indices for each hospital. Id. The variables
taken into account were:
[The] number of full-time employed physicians/residents/interns per
bed; [the] number of full-time equivalent physicians, residents and in-
terns; and [the] number of residency programs (the teaching concept
variables); [the] medical assistance reimbursable in-patient costs ...;
[the] acute care in-patient medical assistance in-patient days ... (medi-
cal assistance volume concept); [the] percentage of persons below the
poverty level in that county, [the] median family income in that county,
[the] percentage of unemployment in that county (environmental char-
acteristics); and [the] Medicare area wage index, total in-patient ex-
penses adjusted for direct medical education and capital/total in-
patient admissions; and [the] total in-patient expenses adjusted for di-
rect medical education and capital/total in-patient days (hospital costs
concept).
9
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rate was "somewhat more than the costs incurred by the lowest-cost hospi-
tal within that group, but considerably less than the costs incurred by
the average hospital within that group."'3 7
Temple University Hospital (Temple) was one of eight hospitals in
the highest cost-factor group.3 8 The district court found that given its
position within the group, it was "simply impossible for ...Temple,
which ranks high in the group, to receive payments equal to its costs,"
because within each group, the "payment rate" portion of the reim-
bursement was closest to the lowest-cost hospital in the group. 39
The district court identified two additional aspects of the MAP plan,
that when combined with Temple's group ranking, further limited the
Medicaid reimbursement received by Temple. 40 First, DPW included a
"budget neutrality" adjustment as part of the revised MAP plan.4 1 The
DPW assigned numerical ranks to each hospital based on the scores ob-
tained from the different variables. Id. After a particular hospital's numerical
rank was established, it was placed into one of eight groups. Id. One group
solely contained the state's three children's hospitals, while all other acute-care
hospitals were distributed in the remaining seven groups. Id. "Group 1" hospi-
tals had the highest cost-factors and "Group 7" had the lowest cost-factors. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added). The district court identified two major problems
with DPW's grouping approach. Id. at 1097-98. First, hospitals at the high end
of one given group could be encouraged to become less efficient in an effort to
move up into the low end of the next higher cost-factor group. Id. at 1097.
Second, one of the goals of hospital group placement was to achieve groups of
near equal size. Id. at 1098. Therefore, wide variations occurred in the cost-
factor scores of the hospitals within each group. Id.
38. Id. at 1098. Group 1 had the highest numerical rankings in the teach-
ing, medical assistance volume, environment and cost factors. Id. The Group
included the six Philadelphia-area teaching hospitals and two community hospi-
tals with high cost-factors. Id.
The district court's opinion explained the reasons behind Temple's high
cost-factor rating. Temple University Hospital is located in a decaying urban
environment where the majority of residents live in poverty. Id. at 1095. The
district court noted that "[50%] of Temple's patients have Medicaid insurance
coverage; 20% are covered by Medicare; and 5% have no coverage." Id. The
Temple patient population has an infant mortality rate twice the national aver-
age and a greater incidence of nutritional deficiencies, drug abuse problems and
sexually transmitted diseases. Id. at 1095-96. Temple also faced greater difficul-
ties than the other hospitals in Group 1 in retaining an adequate ratio of nursing
staff to occupied beds, and its professional liability insurance costs were rising
dramatically. Id. at 1096. In addition to these problems, because of the MAP
plan, Temple only received approximately 81% of its actual costs and lost be-
tween $2.5 million and $7 million per year on acute in-patient care to medical
assistance patients since Pennsylvania's prospective payment reimbursement be-
gan. Id.
39. Id. at 1098. Plaintiffs' expert showed at trial that within the MAP group-
ings, the rank of the hospital and not its efficient use of resources determined its
cost reimbursement. Id. Temple "presented a mass of evidence, which stands
unrebutted, to the effect that it has cut costs in every conceivable way, and that,
as a practical matter, no further 'efficiency' or 'economy' is possible." Id. at
1096.
40. Id. at 1098-99.
41. Id. at 1098. DPW advanced two justifications for the budget neutrality
1090 [Vol. 37: p. 1081
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adjustment resulted in a fourteen percent across-the-board reduction in
reimbursement payments to all health care providers. 4 2 Second, under
the Medicaid statute, hospitals such as Temple were authorized to re-
ceive additional reimbursement as compensation for providing care to a
"disproportionate share" of low-income patients in comparison with
other hospitals.43 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania MAP plan permitted
Temple to receive a disproportionate share rate of two and one-helf per-
cent.4 4 The district court, however, found that the disproportionate
share rate did not adequately reimburse Temple for its disproportionate
share expenses. 45
Because DPW did not make meaningful findings as to whether the
methods and structure of the Pennsylvania MAP plan were proper prior
to restructuring the reimbursement rates, the district court concluded
that the MAP plan violated the procedural requirements of the Boren
Amendment. 46 The district court also concluded that substantive viola-
tions existed in the MAP plan because the reimbursement rates were not
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated facilities," and they did not ade-
adjustment. First, DPW stated the adjustment was necessary, as part of the tran-
sition to a prospective payment plan, to ensure that payments did not exceed
those reimbursed under the prior system. Id. Second, DPW noted that
"shrinkage" commonly occurred between the initial unaudited cost figures sub-
mitted by hospitals under the retrospective payment plan and the final audited
reimbursable cost figures. Id. DPW asserted that the budget neutrality adjust-
ment was designed to replace the "shrinkage" concept under the prospective
payment plan. Id. The district court rejected both justifications as "entirely
budget driven." Id. The court noted that the normal "shrinkage" discrepancy
under the retrospective plan rarely exceeded two percent and that the DPW had
not performed any analysis of cost differences between the retrospective and
prospective payment systems to support their justifications. Id.
In Temple University, the Third Circuit's dissatisfaction with the DPW's
budget-driven reduction was similar to the Tenth Circuit's response to a nearly
identical budget adjustment factor in Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Depart-
ment of Social Services, 879 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
3212 (1990). In Amisub, the Colorado Medicaid Plan included a final 46% reduc-
tion in provider reimbursement that the court characterized as having "no rela-
tion to the actual costs of hospital services." Id. at 792. The Amisub court
rejected the budget reduction factor because even efficiently and economically
operated hospitals could not recover actual costs under the plan. Id.
42. Temple University, 729 F. Supp. at 1098.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(b) (1988).
44. Temple University, 729 F. Supp. at 1099.
45. Id. The district court noted that according to Temple's calculations, the
disproportionate share rate should have been at least 16%. Id. DPW's calcula-
tions, however, established a range of four to five percent. The DPW range was
never implemented. Id.
46. Id. at 1100. The district court found that DPW did not perform studies
"on such matters, for example, as the characteristics of an efficient and economi-
cal hospital operation, the impact of the proposed reimbursement rates upon
hospitals' ability to survive, etc.-but merely certified that its plan complied with
the statutory requirements." Id.
11
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quately address Temple's disproportionate service to low-income pa-
tients. 47 The district court's remedy included a declaratory judgment
and injunction in favor of Temple that required DPW to bring the Penn-
sylvania MAP plan within the Boren Amendment requirements. 48 The
district court provided interim relief by altering the hospital group mix,
decreasing the budget neutrality reduction percentage and increasing
the disproportionate share percentage add-on to more adequately re-
flect Temple's costs.
49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling in an appeal that consolidated the challenges
of over 140 hospitals to DPW's MAP plan. 50 In its approval of the ac-
tions taken and the results reached by the district court, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the finding that both procedural and substantive violations
of federal Medicaid law existed in the Pennsylvania MAP plan. 5'
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1100-01.
49. Temple Univ. v. White, 732 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aft'd,
941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992). Judge Fullam
found that because a portion of the prior reimbursement came from the federal
government's share of Medicaid, the Eleventh Amendment precluded the impo-
sition of any retroactive relief to compensate Temple for its losses. Id. at 1328.
In order to correct the most basic inadequacies in the MAP plan, Judge Fullam
fashioned a reimbursement plan to be used until a revised MAP could be imple-
mented by the state. Id. The first remedial change altered the hospital mix in
Group 1 to eliminate the most dissimilar hospitals, thereby making the group
more homogenous. Id. In addition,Judge Fullam decreased the budget neutral-
ity reduction from 14% to 2.4% and increased the disproportionate share add-
on from 2.5% to not less than 10%. Id. at 1328-29. These changes increased
Temple's base reimbursement rate from $2,695.51 to $3,643.09. Id. Judge Ful-
lam also declined to require that Temple post a security bond to guarantee re-
payment if the interim relief payment exceeded the ultimate reimbursement
rates under the revised MAP plan. Id. at 1329. The financial problems of Tem-
ple coupled with the ongoing relationship between Temple and DPW were the
factors cited by Judge Fullam in refusing to require a bond posting. Id.
50. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 295 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 873 (1992). A number of other Pennsylvania hospitals had filed suits
requesting relief similar to that requested by Temple. Id. at 206. Following the
district court ruling in Temple University, similar orders were granted in these
pending cases "for the reasons stated . . . in [Temple University] (to the extent
those reasons apply to all hospitals, without regard to their classification or
other individual distinguishing features)." Id. (quoting Albert Einstein Medical
Ctr. v. White, 732 F. Supp. 1329, 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 941 F.2d 201 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992)).
During the appeal interval, Sacred Heart Hospital requested and was
granted emergency relief in the form of a $2 million advance from DPW. Id. For
a discussion of Sacred Heart's need for emergency relief, see infra notes 92-94
and accompanying text.
51. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 220. The suits were brought by Temple
and the other providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
1092
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B. Procedural Violation Issues
As previously stated, the procedural requirements of the Boren
Amendment mandate that each state participating in the Medicaid pro-
gram follow specific procedures when a revision of the state Medicaid
plan is implemented. 52 First, the state must perform a "findings" pro-
cess to obtain adequate information to support the proposed revision of
the reimbursement structure. 53 Second, the state agency must provide
"assurances" to the HCFA that all federal requirements have been
met. 54 As articulated by the Tenth Circuit in an influential holding, the
plain language of the Boren Amendment requires, "at a minimum....
'findings' which identify and determine (1) efficiently and economically
operated hospitals; (2) the costs that must be incurred by such hospi-
tals; and (3) payment rates which are reasonable and adequate to meet
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Suits brought under § 1983 for alleged violations of
the Boren Amendment were frequently filed, but they were also frequently chal-
lenged by the state defendants as improper. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ.
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989) (WVUH) (holding that
federal Medicaid legislation gave hospitals private rights enforceable under
§ 1983 and congressional intent absent to preclude suit under § 1983), aff'd,
Ill S. Ct. 1138 (1991); Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs.,
879 F.2d 789, 793 (10th Cir. 1989) (Boren Amendment implies private right of
action under § 1983), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935 (1990); Nebraska Health Care
Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1295 (8th Cir. 1985) (same). The controversy
over § 1983 challenges to the Boren Amendment focused on whether the Medi-
caid statutes created enforceable rights and whether health care providers, rather
than Medicaid recipients, were the intended beneficiaries of such rights. WVUH,
885 F.2d at 17-22. The Supreme Court answered both questions affirmatively in
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1991).
In Wilder, Virginia hospitals filed suit alleging that the state Medical Assist-
ance Plan violated the procedural and substantive requirements of the Boren
Amendment. Id. at 503. The Court held that the Boren Amendment created
substantive rights that obliged states participating in Medicaid to adopt reason-
able and adequate reimbursement rates. Id. at 509-10. The mandatory, rather
than precatory, language of the Boren Amendment and the requirement of fed-
eral approval of state plans were seen as setting forth "a congressional com-
mand, which is wholly uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or 'nudge.' " Id. at
512 (quoting WVUH, 885 F.2d at 20 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981))). The Wilder Court reasoned that health care
providers were the intended beneficiaries of such substantive rights, and there-
fore, they were able to enforce the rights through § 1983 challenges. Id. at 509-
10. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Congress had fore-
closed private enforcement of the Medicaid Act under § 1983 by providing for
an administrative appeal process. Id. at 523. For analysis of the Wilder decision,
see Cusenbary, Note, supra note 12.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (1988) (Boren Amendment). For a dis-
cussion of the procedural requirements of the Boren Amendment, see supra
notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
53. Amisub, 879 F.2d at 796.
54. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (Boren Amendment). For the pre-
cise language of the Boren Amendment, see supra note 14.
1992] 1093
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the reasonable costs of the state's efficiently and economically operated
hospitals."
55
In Temple University, the Third Circuit applied the criteria established
by the Tenth Circuit to the Pennsylvania MAP plan and determined that
the plan violated the procedural requirements of the Boren Amend-
ment. 56 Pursuant to these criteria, the Third Circuit opined that DPW
was required to make sufficient findings regarding issues such as reason-
able rate setting, adequate disproportionate share adjustments and as-
surances of continued access to inpatient hospital care by Medicaid
recipients. 5 7 The Third Circuit emphasized DPW's failure to collect ad-
equate information or to make sufficient findings. 58 The court stated,
55. Amisub, 879 F.2d at 796. A number of other courts faced with similar
allegations of procedural violations, have followed the criteria set forth by the
Amisub court. See, e.g., Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1313(2d Cir. 1991) (declining to read as "mere surplusage" procedural requirements
of Boren Amendment as set forth in Amisub); Multicare Medical Ctr. v. Washing-
ton, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1391 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (state must identify and deter-
mine, implicitly or explicitly, which facilities are efficiently and economically
operated); Rye Psychiatric Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Surles, 768 F. Supp. 82, 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (reliance on data from other states rather than conducting for-
mal in-state study not sufficient to meet "findings" requirement of Boren
Amendment); Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Stangler, 765 F. Supp. 1413, 1415
(W.D. Mo. 1991) (state made "legitimate and thorough" findings regarding
costs incurred by Medicaid facilities and adequacy and reasonableness of reim-
bursement rates but failed to show findings to identify efficiently and economi-
cally operated facilities); Michigan Hosp. Ass'n v. Babcock, 736 F. Supp. 759,
763-64 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (where no findings submitted to court, oral testimony
of state Medicaid employees not sufficient to meet "findings" burden).
56. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 209 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992). The Third Circuit followed the Supreme Court's
view of the "findings" requirement as defined in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 513 & n. 11 (1990), but also noted the Amisub criteria. Tem-
ple University, 941 F.2d at 209 n. 10. The court also cited, with approval, the lan-
guage of the Pinnacle Nursing Home court regarding the importance of following
the proper Boren Amendment procedures. The Pinnacle Nursing Home court
stated:
We decline the state's invitation to read the procedural require-
ments of the Boren Amendment as mere surplusage. The Supreme
Court recently dispelled this notion, reconfirming that the procedural
requirements of the Boren Amendment were intended to be ob-
served .... In light of the abundant evidence demonstrating that Con-
gress intended that the procedural requirements be followed, the
state's argument that "findings" are not mandatory is fatally flawed.
That conclusion is reinforced by the mandatory, rather than precatory,
language of the statute itself.... Although procedural requirements
may reduce some of the state's "flexibility" in determining their own
schemes of reimbursement, this is what the plain language of the stat-
ute requires.
Id. at 209 (quoting Pinnacle Nursing Home, 928 F.2d at 1313-14). For a discussion
of the legislative intent and purposes behind the Boren Amendment, see supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
57. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 210. For a discussion of the substantive
Boren Amendment issues, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
58. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 210. The evidence before the Third Cir-
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"[i]n the absence of essential data and information, DPW was in no posi-
tion to make findings, and clearly did not do so. Any assurances DPW
made to the Secretary were, therefore, without foundation." 59
The Third Circuit's conclusion was in accord with other court opin-
ions evaluating procedural challenges to Medicaid reimbursement plans.
For example, in Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Stangler,60 a group of long-
term care facilities challenged Missouri's Medicaid reimbursement plan.
The plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to make adequate findings
prior to a revision of its reimbursement rates. 6 1 The Stangler court
found that although the state made "legitimate and thorough" findings
regarding the costs incurred by Medicaid facilities and the rates that
would be reasonable and adequate to meet such costs, it failed to make
the findings necessary to determine which facilities were efficiently and
economically operated.6 2 Accordingly, the Stangler court concluded that
the state's "findings" process was inadequate under the Boren Amend-
ment. 6 3 Therefore, because the reasonableness of the reimbursement
rate structure was suspect without adequate findings by the state, the
Strangler court invalidated the reimbursement plan. 64
Court opinions that address Medicaid reimbursement plan issues
reveal a trend that reflects a willingness to protect the right of health
cuit revealed that DPW relied on a few internally generated reports. Id. These
reports contained compilations of the actual patient care costs of the various
hospitals. Id. These costs were then recalculated and revenue projections made
for the hospitals under the groupings established in the prospective payment
reimbursement plan. Id. The court, however, found that the reports did not
address the issues of reasonableness of rates, the need for a budget reduction
percentage, or the appropriateness of the disproportionate share percentage,
and they failed to identify any efficiently and economically operated facilities. Id.
59. Id.
60. 765 F. Supp. 1413 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
61. Id. at 1413-14.
62. Id. at 1415.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1416; see also Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306,
1313-15 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that state decision to revise plan to increase
reimbursement to nursing homes with high labor costs without making findings
was without basis and was procedural violation of Boren Amendment); Amisub
(PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 796-97 (10th Cir.
1989) (noting that state relied on findings made ten years prior to reimburse-
ment rate revision, violating annual findings requirement), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
935 (1990); Multicare Medical Ctr. v. Washington, 768 F. Supp. 1349, 1391
(W.D. Wash. 1991) ("Mere recitation of the wording of the federal statute is
insufficient for procedural compliance. The State must engage in a bona fide
finding process before it submits its assurances to HCFA." (quoting Amisub, 879
F.2d at 797)); Michigan Hosp. Ass'n v. Babcock, 736 F. Supp. 759, 763 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (showing that under state reimbursement plan no Michigan hospital
received complete cost reimbursement established lack of findings to identify
efficiently and economically operated facilities). But cf Folden v. Washington
State Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 744 F. Supp. 1507, 1534 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (indicating Washington made proper findings prior to giving assurances
to HCFA, and did not just "parrot the regulations").
1992] 1095
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care providers to receive reasonable reimbursement for services to
Medicaid patients. 65 In its Temple University decision, the Third Circuit
followed this trend by invalidating the state reimbursement plan and
providing interim relief to the plaintiff hospitals during the period of the
reimbursement plan's revision. 66
C. Substantive Violation Issues
The major substantive focus of the Boren Amendment is the re-
quirement that each Medicaid-participating state utilize its findings to
set reimbursement rates that are "reasonable and adequate to meet the
costs . . .[of] efficiently and economically operated facilities." '6 7 After
affirming the presence of significant procedural violations in the Penn-
sylvania MAP plan, the Temple University court briefly discussed the sub-
stantive inadequacies of the plan. The discussion was brief because, as
the Third Circuit noted, it had previously established and extensively
discussed the substantive Boren Amendment requirements that the
Pennsylvania MAP plan must meet in West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc. v. Casey (WVUH). 68
In WVUH, a West Virginia hospital that provided a significant
amount of health care to Pennsylvania Medicaid recipients challenged
the same DPW MAP plan that was challenged in Temple University.6 9 The
65. See Pinnacle Nursing Home, 928 F.2d at 1310 ("The flexibility given the
States [, however, was] not intended to encourage arbitrary reductions in pay-
ment that would adversely affect the quality of care." (quoting S. REP. No. 139,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 744)). The
various remedies imposed, however, also reflect a willingness of courts to sup-
port the congressional goal of passing greater control and flexibility to the states
in the area of Medicaid reimbursement planning. For a discussion of the con-
gressional intent behind the passage of the Boren Amendment, see supra notes
14-15. Such remedies alter or restrict the state reimbursement plans rather than
require a total invalidation and mandatory use of a court imposed plan. For a
discussion of the remedies imposed by other courts, see infra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text.
66. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 873 (1992).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (1988). For the text of the Boren Amend-
ment, see supra note 14.
The Supreme Court noted in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n that the courts
of appeals generally agree that once the procedural requirements of the Boren
Amendment are met, the federal courts employ a deferential standard of review.
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 n.18 (1990). The Court de-
clined to express an opinion as to the appropriateness of that standard of re-
view. Id.
68. 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989), aff'd 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
69. Id. at 14-15. West Virginia University Hospital (WVUH) is located six
miles south of the Pennsylvania-West Virginia border and serves as the tertiary
referral center for many Pennsylvania Medicaid recipients. Id. at 14. The Third
Circuit noted that "[for the years 1984 to 1987, WVUH gave inpatient hospital
care to more Pennsylvania medicaid patients than did over one-half of the hospi-
tals located in Pennsylvania." Id.
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MAP plan created even greater hardships for the hospital involved in
WVUH, however, because the plan treated out-of-state hospitals differ-
ently than it treated Pennsylvania hospitals. 70 For example, instead of
placing each out-of-state hospital into a "similarly situated group" as
was done with Pennsylvania hospitals, DPW grouped all out-of-state
hospitals together and reimbursed them at the level of average pay-
ments made to Pennsylvania hospitals. 7 ' In addition, under the MAP
plan at issue in WVUH, DPW elected not to reimburse out-of-state hos-
pitals for any direct medical education expenses and paid a much lower
capital cost reimbursement rate to out-of-state hospitals.7 2
In WVUH, the Third Circuit identified three substantive require-
ments of the Boren Amendment that the Pennsylvania MAP plan had to
meet:
The first requirement . . . mandates that a state's reim-
bursement rates take into account the situations of those hospi-
tals serving a disproportionate number of low income patients.
The second and third requirements ... require a state to find
that its rates are reasonable and adequate to meet the necessary
costs of an efficiently operated hospital and to assure medicaid
patients of reasonable access to inpatient hospital care. 73
Using these criteria, the Third Circuit in WVUH concluded that:
1) the MAP plan did not adequately address or reimburse for WVUH's
status as a disproportionate share provider;7 4 2) the MAP plan could
potentially interfere with Medicaid recipients' reasonable access to qual-
ity health care; 75 and 3) the MAP plan failed to provide rates that were
70. Id. at 16.
71. Id. The grouping of all out-of-state providers together for reimburse-
ment rate purposes had a disparate impact on WVUH because the hospital was a
tertiary referral center with higher costs than primary or secondary hospitals,
and because WVUH was the largest out-of-state provider of medical services to
Pennsylvania Medicaid patients. Id. at 14-15. The result of the DPW MAP reim-
bursement plan was that the average in-state Pennsylvania hospital was reim-
bursed approximately 95% of its actual costs for treating Medicaid patients,
while WVUH recouped only 54% of its actual costs. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 16-17. Given WVUH's status as a large tertiary hospital with med-
ical residency programs, these decisions adversely affected the reimbursement
rate received by WVUH. Id. at 28. For a discussion of the factors considered
during the development of the Pennsylvania MAP plan, see supra notes 34-36
and accompanying text.
73. WVUH, 885 F.2d at 22.
74. Id. at 24-25. The WVUH court noted that DPW made no attempt to
study or make findings concerning the effect of the MAP disproportionate share
element on out-of-state providers. Id. at 24. Because 38% of WVUH's patient
mix was low-income patients (although only 5% of WVUH's admissions were
Pennsylvania Medicaid recipients), the Pennsylvania MAP plan violated the fed-
eral requirement that such disproportionate share providers be reimbursed for
this excess load. Id. at 24-25.
75. Id. at 25. The Third Circuit evaluated the district court's findings that
19921 1097
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"'reasonable and adequate' to meet the costs of an efficiently operated
hospital."176
In Temple University, the Third Circuit focused on the procedural vio-
lations inherent in the MAP plan. 77 Consequently, it did not address in
detail the alleged substantive violations.78 The Third Circuit did hold,
however, that without findings to provide adequate (or even any) infor-
mation regarding the substantive concerns, as identified in WVUH, the
MAP plan must fail. 79
. D. Interim Injunctive Relief Issues
Generally, once a successful procedural and/or substantive chal-
lenge of a state Medicaid reimbursement plan is found, a court may in-
stitute a variety of available remedies.8 0 These remedies include an
order requiring a state to reformulate its reimbursement plan,8 ' an in-
junction preventing a state from applying a deficient reimbursement
plan for one fiscal year,8 2 and an injunction preventing a state from ap-
plying an arbitrary across-the-board budgetary reduction.8 3 In Temple
University, the relief that the district court afforded the plaintiffs was
continued reimbursement under the MAP plan at issue could increase the likeli-
hood that WVUH would withdraw from the Pennsylvania Medicaid plan. Id.
Such a withdrawal could require Pennsylvania Medicaid recipients to travel as
much as 70 miles for tertiary hospital care. Id. The Third Circuit, however,
stopped short of invalidating the Pennsylvania MAP plan on this basis because
the record did not contain clear evidence that WVUH seriously considered with-
drawal from the Pennsylvania Medicaid program. Id.
76. Id. at 26, 29. The WVUH court decided that the dual reimbursement
scheme allowed WVUH to be reimbursed at a significantly lower rate despite
similarities between WVUH and tertiary teaching hospitals within Pennsylvania.
Id. at 28. Such disparity was found to be outside the "zone of reasonableness."
Id. The court rejected as inadequate rationales such as Pennsylvania's prefer-
ence for its own hospitals and the increased administrative burden associated
with transacting with an out-of-state provider. Id. at 28-29.
77. For a discussion of the portion of the Temple University opinion that fo-
cused on the procedural violations of the Boren Amendment, see supra notes 52-
66 and accompanying text.
78. See Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992).
79. Id. The Third Circuit noted that DPW insisted that proper findings had
been made, but no specific findings were entered into the record to support this
contention despite repeated questioning by the court. Id. at 211 n.12.
80. For a discussion of these various remedies, see Leonard Weiser-Varon,
Injunctive Relieffrom State Violations of Federal Funding Conditions, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
1236 (1982).
81. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 35 (3d
Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). The Third Circuit gave the Penn-
sylvania DPW 90 days to reformulate its MAP plan to provide reimbursement to
WVUH that conformed with federal law. Id.
82. See, e.g., Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1294
(8th Cir. 1985).
83. See, e.g., Lapeer County Medical Care Facility v. Michigan, 765 F. Supp.
1291, 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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more sweeping than any of these alternatives because the district court
ordered that specific interim changes be made to the MAP plan to in-
crease the reimbursement rates provided to the plaintiffs. 84
On appeal, DPW challenged the relief granted on a number of
grounds. First, DPW argued that the district court erred in extending
the specific findings of the Temple University suit to other hospitals which
had brought similar but separate actions. 8 5 The Third Circuit, however,
concluded that this argument was meritless under the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel.8 6 In so holding, the court noted that "the issues raised by
the hospitals in their related cases were raised, actually litigated, and
decided against DPW in the Temple case[, that DPW] . . .had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate those issues . .. [and that] the decision...
constituted a valid and final judgment on the Temple merits."8 7
Second, DPW argued that the interim relief granted by the district
court was an invalid preliminary injunction because the district court
failed to find that irreparable harm had occurred. 8 8 The Third Circuit
disagreed with DPW's characterization of the interim relief and instead,
identified the interim relief granted as a permanent injunction.89 This
characterization by the Third Circuit, however, failed to resolve the is-
sue of whether the district court was required to find that irreparable
harm existed in order to grant a permanent injunction.9 0 Courts hold
conflicting opinions regarding whether a plaintiff must establish the
84. See Temple Univ. v. White,, 732 F. Supp. 1327, 1327-29 (E.D. Pa.
1990), aft'd, 941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992). For
a discussion of the changes made by the district court, see supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
85. See Temple University, 941 F.2d at 212. The multiple actions were consol-
idated into one appeal before the Third Circuit. Id. at 205.
86. Id. at 212. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the plaintiffs were
required to prove:
(1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the
one presented in the later action;
(2) There was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) The party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication; and
(4) The party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue in question in the prior action.
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 121 (3d Cir. 1988)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 213. In characterizing the interim relief as a preliminary injunc-
tion, DPW averred that irreparable harm must be shown. Id. Prior to granting a
request for a preliminary injunction, the trial court must find:
(1) [T]he likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits at final
hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiffs are being irreparably harmed
by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the defendants
will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and
(4) the public interest.
Bill Blass, Ltd. v. Saz Corp., 751 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
89. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 213.
90. Id.
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presence of irreparable harm in order to obtain a permanent injunc-
tion.9 1 The Third Circuit declined to address the issue because it found
that evidence of irreparable harm was present throughout the record. 92
Therefore, the Third Circuit upheld the injunctive relief fashioned by
the district court.93
Another district court order contained within the consolidated ap-
peals before the Temple University court required DPW to make a two
million dollar advance payment to Sacred Heart Hospital in order for
the hospital to stave off insolvency. 94 DPW argued that irreparable
harm was not adequately shown to exist and that Sacred Heart's insol-
vency was not related to DPW's MAP plan.9 5 In rejecting DPW's argu-
ment, the Third Circuit upheld the relief, concluding that the district
court's ruling was not clearly erroneous and that the district court did
91. Compare Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. &
Mktg., Inc., 906 F.2d 934, 938 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that it had "repeatedly
held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been
irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies" (quoting Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 US. 305, 312 (1982))) with Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919
F.2d 857, 867 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that three prerequisites for permanent
injunctive relief include showing that balance of equities tips in favor of injunc-
tive relief, but does not include identifying need for irreparable harm) and Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 747 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1984) (not-
ing that once party succeeds on federal claims, permanent injunction is upheld
"so long as the balance of equities favors injunctive relief"), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1137 (1985).
92. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 213-14. Irreparable harm was present be-
cause, without a working MAP plan (invalidated by the district court), Medicaid
reimbursement would not be given to hospital-providers until the completion of
a revised plan. Id. at 214. The Third Circuit also noted that the other elements
required to obtain permanent injunctive relief were present. Id. at 215. First,
Temple was successful on the merits of its claim. Id. Second, because of Elev-
enth Amendment restrictions on retroactive relief, only an equitable remedy was
available. Id. For a discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue, see supra note
49.
93. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 215, 220. The Third Circuit was "satisfied
that the district court had inherent discretion to fashion a remedy in aid of, and
in implementation of, its own judgment which required DPW to formulate a new
MAP." Id. at 215. The district court's discretion in such a setting is to affirma-
tively correct the conditions present by "balancing the individual and collective
interests." Id.; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (1971); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 145 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
94. Temple University, 941 F.2d at 216. The payment was an advance against
future medical assistance payments. Id. The district court determined that the
DPW MAP plan substantially contributed to Sacred Heart's potential financial
collapse. Id. at 218. The decision was based on the "underpayment of Medicaid
rates to Sacred Heart in past years; DPW's failure to promulgate a new MAP
providing for a higher payment rate; and the need 'to make some appropriate
adjustment for the interim period ... which will prevent the insolvence [sic] or a
bankruptcy of Sacred Heart Medical Center at least in that interim period.' " Id.
(quoting Appendix at 154, Temple University (No. 90-1661)).
95. Id. at 217.
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not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunctive relief.96
III. CONCLUSION
In Temple University, the Third Circuit joined other courts of appeals
in upholding the right of health care providers to insist that state Medi-
caid reimbursement plans provide "reasonable and adequate" rates to
cover the costs of "efficiently and economically" operated health care
facilities. 9 7 Decisions such as Temple University guarantee that the proce-
dural and substantive requirements Congress established in the Boren
Amendment will be followed. 98 These courts require states to affirma-
tively make detailed findings prior to the implementation of their re-
vised Medicaid reimbursement plans because they find that "[mlere
recitation of the wording of the federal statute is not sufficient." 99 In
fact, the Third Circuit went further than previous courts by upholding a
remedy fashioned by the district court which affirmatively altered the
state Medicaid reimbursement plan until the court-mandated revision
would become operational. 10 0
Currently, a high level of interest in the topic of health care financ-
ing exists. Decisions such as Temple University reveal a judicial willing-
ness to intervene when governmental reimbursement to health care
providers delivering services to Medicaid recipients is inadequate. In
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit's complete affirmation of the district
court order has led to improved reimbursement to those hospitals that
provide necessary health care treatment to the indigent and medically
needy. How judicial opinions like Temple University will co-exist with the
current political plans to decrease the federal and state support of Medi-
care and Medicaid programs is an open question.' 0 ' The reality that
96. Id. at 218-19. The Third Circuit stated that "[from any standpoint, and
particularly considering the fact that no legal remedy was either adequate or
available, we conclude that the district court's injunctive order was well within its
broad discretionary power." Id.
The Third Circuit also affirmed the district court's decision to order this
advance payment without requiring Sacred Heart to post a bond pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). Id. Relying on Crowley v. Local No. 82,
Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds,
467 U.S. 526 (1984), the Temple University court held that the ongoing relation-
ship between Sacred Heart and DPW, as well as the dire financial straits of Sa-
cred Heart, were sufficient to waive the bond requirement. Temple University, 941
F.2d at 219-20.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) (1988) (Boren Amendment
requirements).
98. For a discussion of the procedural and substantive requirements of the
Boren Amendment, see supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
99. Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789,
797 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990).
100. For a discussion of the district court remedy, see supra notes 48-49
and accompanying text.
101. See Russell E. Eshleman, Jr. & Robert Zausner, Casey Plan Cuts Funds for
Welfare, Education, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 6, 1992, at Al, A18 (calling for cuts in
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there are limited dollars for health care may hinder the ability of states
to provide adequate reimbursement. Therefore, despite the presence of
judicial support in decisions such as Temple University, Pennsylvania hos-
pitals may still find it difficult to obtain adequate reimbursement for the
care of Medicaid recipients.
Mary J. Mullany
state medical assistance plan and describing plan as "the uncontrolled, runaway
locomotive that is driving most state budgets"); Michael Wines, Bush Unveils Plan
for Health Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1992, at AI (commenting that proposed plan
to improve overall national access to health care could be financed, in part, by
limiting growth of Medicare and Medicaid).
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